The purpose behind framing any statute is mainly for the public benefit. The legislature is presumed to have a certain meaning of the words of any particular statute. Any statute framed should be in accordance with such meaning. During the interpretation of any statute, the rules of interpretation are used to gather the facts and they are processed to clear the ambiguity and vagueness of the statute and to get a clear meaning to the word. When the words of statutes are open to more than one interpretation, then the court will have to choose the intention of the legislature which is used in enacting a statute representing the true intention of the legislature. Thus, in this case, the court will look into the legal meaning or true meaning of all the statutory provisions.
It is axiomatic that there is no problem of interpretation when the legislative declaration is clear, direct, and precise. Interpretation is legitimate only in the case of ambiguity. Let us understand what is meant by the words ‘clear’ and ‘ambiguous’. When X says to Y, “A big bundle of bills came this morning”, does Y know what X received? The statement is clear to X; to Y it may or may not be ambiguous. To objectively evaluate the statement is misleading and inaccurate. Y is only interested in learning what meaning X is trying to convey. A similar interest should motivate courts in the use of statutory materials.
The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed “according to the intent of they that made it.” Normally such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or phraseology employed by the Legislature is precise and plain and this by itself proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same intent must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, evocative, and ambiguous or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction cannot be applied. In such cases, the real legislative intent helps in the interpretation of the statute. In such a case, the court has to see legislative history, the basic scheme or framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation. Where two alternative constructions are possible, the court will choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and representing the intention of legislature avoiding absurdity, confusion or friction, contradiction and conflict between its various provisions or undermines or tends to defeat or destroy any basic scheme or purpose of the enactment.
Principles Used to Find Intention of Legislature:
Certain principles of interpretation are formulated by the Superior Courts to find out the intention of the legislature.
Literal construction:
The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first and the most elementray rule of construction. According to this rule, it is the duty of the court to expound the law as it stands and not to modify, alter or qualify its language. The courts are bound by the legislature and once any legislature has expressed its intention in clear words they are binding. If the words are clear in a legislature they should be applied even though their intention may be different or the result is harsh or undesirable. If any provision is unambiguous, the legislative intent is clear and the other rules of construction are not clear they need not be called for any aid. They will be aided only when the legislative intention is not clear. Only when a statue is not exhaustive or it is ambiguous or uncertain the external aid may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object for framing any statute in the legislature.
In Cartledge v. Japling € & Sons, 1963 AC 758 case, the Court said that: “whereby the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to the common sense the result may be.”
Mischief rule (Heydon’s case):
The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to discover Parliament’s intention. The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent as it allows to effectively decide on the intention of the legislature. This rule was laid down by Lord Coke in Heydon’s (1584) 76 ER 637 case. Whenever there arises any question as to determine any interpretation in an enactment, the court will have to ascertain the intention of making them and they must be gathered from the words used in the statute. The decision should not rest on a literal interpretation. Literal construction should have a prima facie preference.
According to this rule, for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered –
- What was the common law before the passing of the Act?
- What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
- What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the Commonwealth”.
- The true reasons for the remedy.
In Badshah v. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse, AIR 2014 SC 869 case, the Supreme Court has held that a provision like Section 125 of CrPC is aimed at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of the individual. While dealing with the application under this provision the court should take into consideration only the purpose of statute but also the mischief which it seeks to suppress.
Words coupled together to take colour from each other:
When two or more words which have analogous meaning are coupled together, they are to be understood in proper sense and not in a wrong way. This rule will not apply in a case where the legislature has used more or wider words to widen the scope of any provision.
The Golden Rule:
It is the modification of the literal rule of interpretation. The literal rule emphasises on the literal meaning of legal words or words used in the legal context which may often lead to ambiguity and absurdity. The golden rule tries to avoid anomalous and absurd consequences from arising from literal interpretation. In view of the same, the grammatical meaning of such words is usually modified. If the language permits, it is open to the court using the golden rule to give the statute any meaning which promotes the intent of legislation. The object of this approach of interpretation is of giving effect to the spirit of the law as the mere mechanical and grammatical meaning may not be sufficient.
In Becke v. Smith (1836) 2 M & W 191 at page 195 case, Lord Parke B formulated the rule as follows: “it is a very useful rule, in the construction of the statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.”
Absurdity or hardship:
The court will have no power to give the language of a statue a meaning which is wider than the literal one, until there is any reason compelling to give another meaning. If while interpreting natural meaning results in any sought of repugnance, ambiguity, absurdity or hardship then the court must modify the aiming to the extent of injustice or absurdity caused and no further to stop the results. If a literal interpretation of a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not Intended, then a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. Again, however, the Court has no power to give the language of the statute a wider or narrower meaning than the literal one, unless there is compelling reason to give such other meaning. If the language is plain the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a provision, as it is for the Legislature to step in and remove the absurdity. If on either of two possible views hardship must result to one or the other party, then the considerations of hardship ought to be ignored.
Liberal construction:
In construing a provision of a statute the Court should be slow to adopt construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. It is necessary and legitimate to adopt the rule of liberal construction as to give a reason and meaning to all parts present in a statue and to make it effective and operative. The narrower and wider sense of a term is adopted and it depends on the provisions of the statute in which the term occurs depending on the various facts and circumstances of the case. If any words used in the provision are capable of only one construction, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be of any help. The enactments related to procedures should be construed liberally in a manner as to render the enforcement of rights effective. This rule will apply to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provision. Whether the narrower or the wider sense of a term should be adopted depends not only on the provisions of the statute in which that term occurs but also on facts and circumstances of each case.
This rule applies to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions alike. Welfare, social and beneficial statutes are not to be construed strictly. Doubts are resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. On the other hand penal and taxing statutes and statutes excluding Court’s jurisdiction should be strictly construed.
Harmonious construction:
Every statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be a harmonious one. It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in such conflict with each other, that both of them cannot stand together, they should possibly be so interpreted that effect can be given to both and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort.
The rule of harmonious construction applies and to different cognate acts such as the court fees or the civil procedure code.
Conclusion:
When the words of statutes are open to more than one interpretation, then the court will have to choose the intention of the legislature which is used in enacting a statute representing the true intention of the legislature. Thus, in this case, the court will look into the legal meaning or true meaning of all the statutory provisions. The usage of the intention of a legislature by every court should be justified by a proper reason and it should not be left open to statutes which are present.